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Abstract—This paper presents a new data-driven fault identi-
fication and controller reconfiguration algorithm. The presented
algorithm relies only on the system’s input and output data, and
it does not require a detailed system description. The proposed
algorithm detects changes in the input-output behavior of the
system, whether due to faults or malicious attacks and then
reacts by reconfiguring the existing controller. This method does
not identify the internal structure of the system nor the extent
and nature of the attack; hence it can quickly react to faults
and attacks. The proposed method can be readily applied to
various applications without significant modifications or tuning,
as demonstrated by the examples in the paper.
Index Terms—Data-driven control, fault detection, controller
reconfiguration, safety, passivity indices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Faults in a densely interconnected and tightly coupled
network consisting of computation, communication and control
components can lead to cascading effects disrupting the
operation of the network. Modern dynamical systems should
have the ability to restructure and adjust the control loop
in the event of a fault. The nature and extent of faults in
most cases are not predictable in advance, and considering
all possibilities case by case in the design is not realistic.
Designing a controller that is inherently fault-tolerant can also
compromise the nominal performance. This study presents a
data-driven method to detect a fault in the system through input
and output data, without relying on a full system description,
and then mitigating the effects of the fault through an adaptive
controller reconfiguration.
Several methods exist to improve the response of a system
to a fault. Fault-tolerant control deals with systems subjects
to a fault (as opposed to classical control which only consider
systems during normal operations). These methods are divided
into “passive” approaches (not to be confused with passivity
based approaches) and “active” approaches. In the first category,
the controller can handle faults without any changes (this
includes robust control approaches). The type and the extent of
the faults they can tolerate is limited, and they are designed to
address different fault cases and nominal operation, resulting
in suboptimal overall performance. A formal definition and
examples are reported in [1]. The active approach, on the other
hand, refers to designing strategies where a “re-design” or
“reconfiguration” happens in response to the occurrence of the
fault. These approaches either explicitly isolate and identify
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the fault, or the controller changes in response to the fault, but
without explicitly identifying the fault [2]. See also [3] for an
example. See [4] for a review of different fault identification
techniques.
Reconfigurable control, which refers to re-design or re-
adjustment of the control algorithm to ensure safe operation of
the dynamical system with some performance guarantees in the
event of a fault [5], has been studied via several approaches.
Fault hiding control places a reconfiguration block between the
nominal controller and the faulty plant such that the system
appears to be in a no-fault condition to the controller [6], [7].
Model matching is a methodology where a control system
is designed to make the output of the plant to follow the
output of the desired behavioral model [8]. The pseudo-inverse
method (PIM), which is a widely used design approach for
reconfigurable control systems, is a special case of classical
linear model-following control [9]. We also refer readers
to [10]–[13] and the references therein for other reconfiguration
approaches. Recently, model predictive control reconfiguration
and predictive based fault detection and reconfiguration have
been studied as well [14]–[17].
In this paper, we present a new fault identification method
based on input and output data from the system. This method
does not rely on a full detailed description of the system’s
behavior; therefore it can be readily applied to different
applications. Since this method does not try to identify a
detailed model for the system, it has the advantage of quick
detection of the fault. Based on this method, we also present
an adaptive controller reconfiguration to mitigate the effect of
the fault. The controller reconfiguration method does not try to
design a new controller from scratch, but it relies on the existing
controller in the system (relying on the existing controller is an
essential criterion in many industrial applications) and mitigates
the fault by interfacing the controller with a real matrix which
is determined online. In other words, an interface is wrapped
around the current controller to mitigate the effects of the fault.
In this paper, we focus on describing this novel approach in
detail, explaining how it can be applied in practice.
After the preliminaries in section II, we present the fault
identification and mitigation method is section III. Even though
the identification and control reconfiguration are presented
as one algorithm, one can employ the identification process
separately as well. Section IV presents examples of using
this algorithm with simulation results. Conclusions and further
directions are presented in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here we introduce the passivity indices of a system, and
then we cover stability results and a passivation method based
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Fig. 1. The general feedback interconnection of two dynamical systems G1
and G2
on passivity indices. Consider a continuous-time dynamical
system H : u→ y, where u ∈ U ⊆ Rm denotes the input and
y ∈ Y ⊆ Rp denotes the corresponding output. There exists a
real-valued function w(u(t),y(t)) (often written as w(t) when
clear from content) associated with H, such that for all input
and output pairs of u(t) and y(t) of the system,
t1∫
t0
|w(t)|dt <∞. (1)
This function is called supply rate function. for every t0 and
t1. Now consider a continuous-time system described by
x˙ = f(x,u)
y = h(x,u),
(2)
where f(·, ·) and h(·, ·) are Lipschitz mappings of proper
dimensions, and assume the origin is an equilibrium point
of the system; i.e., f(0, 0) = 0 and h(0, 0) = 0.
Definition 1. The system described by (2) is called dissipative
with respect to supply rate function w(u(t),y(t)), if there
exists a nonnegative real-valued scalar function V (x), called
the storage function, such that V (0) = 0 and for all x0 ∈ X ,
all t1 ≥ t0, and all u ∈ Rm
V (x(t1))− V (x(t0)) ≤
t1∫
t0
w(u(t),y(t)) dt. (3)
where x(t0) = x0 and x(t1) is the state at t1 resulting from
initial condition x0 and input function u(·). Inequality (3) is
called dissipation inequality and expresses the fact that the
energy “stored” in the system at any time t is not more than
the initially stored energy plus the total energy supplied to the
system by its input during this time.
Definition 2. The system (2) is called passive, if it is dissipative
with respect to the supply rate function w(u,y) = uᵀy. If
V (x) is differentiable, then this is equivalent to
V˙ (x) , ∂V
∂x
· f(x,u) ≤ uᵀy. (4)
Passivity indices are introduced as measures of passivity and
they extend passivity based tools to non-passive systems as
well.
Definition 3 (Input Feed-forward Passivity Index). The sys-
tem (2) is called Input Feed-forward Passive (IFP) if it is
dissipative with respect to supply rate function w(u,y) =
uᵀy − νuᵀu for some ν ∈ R, denoted as IFP(ν). Input feed-
forward passivity index for system (2) is the largest ν for
which the system is IFP. This is equivalent to the following
dissipativity inequality
V˙ (x) ≤ uᵀy − νuᵀu (5)
holding for the largest ν.
IFP index is equivalent to the largest gain that can be put in
a negative feed-forward interconnection with the system such
that the overall system is passive.
Definition 4 (Output Feedback Passivity). The system (2) is
called Output Feedback Passive (OFP) if it is dissipative with
respect to supply rate function w(u,y) = uᵀy − ρyᵀy for
some ρ ∈ R, denoted as OFP(ρ). Output feedback passivity
index for system (2) is the largest ρ for which the system is
OFP. This is equivalent to the following dissipativity inequality
V˙ (x) ≤ uᵀy − ρyᵀy (6)
holding for the largest ρ.
OFP index is the largest gain that can be placed in positive
feedback with a system such that the interconnected system is
passive. If either one of the indices for a system is positive, we
say that the system has an “excess of passivity,” and similarly,
if either one is negative, we say the system has a “shortage of
passivity.”
When applying the two indices simultaneously, a system is
said to have IFP() and OFP(δ), or IF-OFP(, δ), based on the
following dissipation inequality:
T∫
0
[(1 + δ)uᵀy − δyᵀy − uᵀu] dt ≥ V (x(T ))− V (x(0)).
(7)
When  = 0 and δ = 0 the passivity index condition reduces
to the definition of passivity [18].
Remark 1. When the dynamical system is given as an input-
output map (with no internal description or initial conditions),
it is common to assume the storage function is equivalent to
zero; i.e., if the system is defined as G : u 7→ y, then passivity
is equivalent to uᵀGu ≥ 0 or uᵀy ≥ 0 for all u ∈ U .
Passivity indices under operationa limitations for nonlinear
systems as well as approximate methods to find them are
presented in [19]. Local passivity indices for nonlinear systems
and sum of squares methods to find the local indices are also
presented in [20].
A. Stability Properties
Lemma 1 ([21]). Consider the feedback interconnection of
Figure 1 and suppose each feedback component satisfies the
inequality
V˙i ≤ uᵀi yi − νiuᵀi ui − ρiyᵀi yi, (8)
for some storage function Vi(xi) where i = 1, 2. Then, the
closed-loop map from
[
r1
r2
]
to
[
y1
y2
]
is finite gain L2 stable if
ν1 + ρ2 > 0 and ν2 + ρ1 > 0.
The above theorem assumes the validity of the feedback inter-
connection, i.e., both systems are square with the same number
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Fig. 2. The feedback interconnection of dynamical system G and controller
C in nominal condition
of inputs and outputs. For a more general interconnection, see
e.g. [22], [23].
A relaxed version of the above theorem, stated for linear
systems, is given as follows.
Lemma 2 ([24], [25]). Consider the feedback interconnection
of two linear systems where the indices exist for both systems.
Assume that one of the two systems lacks either OFP or IFP
on some time interval. This interconnection is Lyapunov stable
if the following inequalities hold,
ρ1 + ν2 ≥ 0 (9)
ρ2 + ν1 ≥ 0. (10)
For more information on passivity indices and their applica-
tions in Cyber-physical system design, see [26], [27].
B. Passivation and Design based on the M-matrix Method
Passivity indices can be adjusted by series, feedback, or
parallel interconnections. A generalization of these methods
is given in [28] by using an input-output transformation
matrix. Appropriate design of this matrix, called the M-matrix,
guarantees positive passivity levels for the system. Consider
the system G and a general input-output transformation matrix
M.The matrix M is considered to be invertible and defined as
M ,
[
m11I m12I
m21I m22I.
]
(11)
It is shown in [28] that the passivity indices of the system
Σ0 : u0 → y0 defined as[
u0
y0
]
= M
[
u
y
]
(12)
depend on the gain γ of system G and the elements of M, as
stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Consider a finite gain stable system C with gain γ
and a passivation matrix M as shown in Figure 5. The system
Σ0 : y → u is
1) passive, if M is chosen such that
m11 = m21, m22 = −m21, m11 ≥ m22γ > 0. (13)
2) OFP with OFP level ρ0 = 12
(
m11
m21
+ m12m22
)
> 0, if
m21 ≥ m22γ > 0, m11m22 > m12m21 > 0. (14)
3) IFP with IFP level ν0 = 12
(
m21
m11
+ m22m12
)
> 0, if
m11 ≥ m12γ > 0, m12m21 > m11m22 > 0. (15)
4) IF-OFP with passivity indices δ0 = 12
m11
m21
> 0 and 0 =
a
2
m21
m11
> 0, if
m11 > 0, m12 = 0, m21 ≥ m22γ√
1− a > 0, (16)
where 0 < a < 1 is an arbitrary real number.
For proof of Lemma 3, see [29]. This passivation method is
applied in [30] to a human controller.
III. DATA-DRIVEN ALGORITHM
Consider the usual control loop in Figure 2 as a special
case of Figure 1. Assume, under nominal operation, this loop
satisfies the condition in Lemma 1; i.e., if the system G has
passivity indices (ρ, ν) and the controller has (ρc, νc), then
ρ+ νc > 0 and ν + ρc > 0.
The algorithm looks at the input and output data from the
system, namely u(t) and y(t), then derives estimates ρ˜ and ν˜ of
the passivity indices. These two estimates are then compared to
set thresholds to detect whether there have been any significant
changes to the system or not. The thresholds should be chosen
close to the real indices of the system. If at least one of the
estimated indices is lower than the threshold, and it has not
been lower before, then the controller reconfiguration procedure
will be initiated. The reconfiguration procedure involves the
M -matrix discussed earlier. The reconfiguration will vary based
on how both indices compare to the thresholds. If they are both
lower, then the design objective would be to compensate for
both of them; otherwise the reconfiguration will compensate
for only one of them. It is important to note that we do not
try to change the passivity indices of the plant but to make
sure that the loop satisfies Lemma 1.
The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1,
ρ¯ and ν¯ are estimates of the indices, and the variables ρmin
and νmin keep track of changes in the estimated indices. If any
of the indices go below these thresholds, the reconfiguration
matrix needs to be recomputed. Otherwise, the index has had
a lower value, and the corresponding reconfiguration is still
valid. Parameters ρ0 and ν0 are desired or safe values for the
indices, and as long as the indices are not lower than these
thresholds, the system is performing properly. Once ρ¯ and ν¯
go below thresholds ρ0 and ν0, this indicates a malfunction in
the system (more on this in the next section).
Σ0
G
r e y
d
M
Cu0 y0
−
u
Fig. 3. The feedback interconnection of a dynamical system G and controller
C with the reconfiguration interface
4Data: Input and output to the system e and y
Result: The reconfiguration matrix M
ρmin ←∞;
νmin ←∞;
M ← I2;
while there is no manual override do
t← time;
Compute ρ0 and ν0 :
ρ¯ =
∫ t
0
eᵀy dτ∫ t
0
yᵀy dτ
, ν¯0 =
∫ t
0
eᵀy dτ∫ t
0
eᵀedτ
if ρ¯ < ρ0 and ν¯ ≥ ν0 then
Indicate a fault;
if ρ¯ < ρmin then
ρmin ← ρ¯;
Compensate for IFP
using Lemma 3 and Eq. (15);
νc(new) + ρ¯ > ε;
else
Already compensated, move on;
end
end
if ρ¯ ≥ ρ0 and ν¯ < ν0 then
Indicate a fault;
if ν¯ < νmin then
νmin ← ν¯;
Compensate for OFP
using Lemma 3 and Eq. (14);
;
ρc(new) + ν¯ > ε;
else
Already compensated, move on;
end
end
if ρ¯ < ρ0 and ν¯ < ν0 then
Indicate a fault;
if ν¯ < νmin or ρ¯ < ρmin then
νmin ← ν¯;
ρmin ← ρ¯;
Compensate for IF-OFP
using Lemma 3 and Eq. (16);
ρc(new) + ν¯ > ε;
νc(new) + ρ¯ > ε;
else
Already compensated, move on;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: The identification and reconfiguration algorithm
A. A Closer Look at the Estimation of the Passivity Indices
It is important to note that our goal here is not to derive
precise estimates of the passivity indices. To do so, one requires
to either excite the system with various inputs to achieve an
upper bound for the indices (see [31], [32] for a detailed
discussion), or find the right kind of input that will lead to the
actual indices or close to the actual indices (see [33]–[35] for
example). However, both of these techniques are more suitable
as offline methods. In the real-time estimation of the indices,
one usually does not have the freedom to modify the input
applied to the system.
The estimations can be represented as functions of time
ρ¯(t) =
∫ t
0
eᵀy dτ∫ t
0
yᵀy dτ
, ν¯0(t) =
∫ t
0
eᵀy dτ∫ t
0
eᵀedτ
. (17)
If ρ and ν represent the actual indices of the system, based
on the definition, the dissipation inequality should hold for all
possible inputs. However, ρ¯ and ν¯ correspond to a limited set
of inputs to the system; therefore, we can bound them as
ρ¯(t) ≥ ρ, ν¯(t) ≥ ν, ∀t, u(t). (18)
This is mainly because the definition of the indices implies a
min-max optimization as
ρ = min
u
max
e
 (19)
such that uᵀy− yᵀy holds (ν would be analogous). Therefore,
for a particular input, our estimate is going to be greater or
equal to the actual index. Here, in the proposed algorithm, the
objective is not to precisely measure the system’s passivity
indices; rather, we use the estimates ρ¯ and ν¯ as indicators of
the system’s operation: if they do not meet certain criteria,
then it is an indication of a malfunction in the system.
Integral Saturation and Overuse: If the system is running
for a long time, there is a possibility that the integrators in (17)
saturate overtime. Another possibility in longtime use is that∫ t
0
uᵀy dτ,
∫ t
0
yᵀy dτ, and
∫ t
0
uᵀudτ might become very large,
and a fault in the system would not be reflected by changes of
a passivity index. One possible remedy is to either reset the
integrators once in a while or integrate over a moving window;
i.e., the lower limit of the integrals in (17) would be t− t0.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
−4
−2
0
2
time
y(
t)
output
output
Fig. 4. The output of the system with the data-driven algorithm in action
when the fault is modeled as a time delay
5IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide three different examples to
demonstrate how this algorithm works. In each example, a
nominal system is working in the loop with a controller. After
sometime, a fault or attack happens in the system, which is
modeled as a change in the dynamics of the system. The
nominal dynamics, the nature of the change, and the new
dynamics are unknown to the algorithm. In each example, the
same algorithm is applied, with different parameters, to keep
the closed-loop stable.
The first two examples are identical in the nominal operation
and algorithm parameters. The same algorithm can handle
different faults or attacks happening to the system. The first
fault is modeled as a time-varying delay introduced to the
system, and the second one is addition of nonlinear dynamics.
It is worth noting that there are many methods to handle time-
varying delays, and many methods to handle nonlinearities;
however, they all need to be designed in advance for delay
or nonlinearity, and they may compromise the design by
being robust to the fault. In our presented method, there is
no knowledge of what will happen in the system, and the
alforithm will only reconfigure the controller if the nominal
operation is compromised. The last example demonstrates a
physical system with mass, damper, and spring, where the
spring changes dynamics overtime.
A. Time Delay due to Actuator Failure or DoS Attacks
This numerical example demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed method in identifying and then mitigating a
malfunction where the fault is a time delay, which can model
either an actuator fault or a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [36].
The system is running in nominal operation with its own
controller in the loop. A delay is introduced in the system, and
is gradually increased.
Consider the loop configuration of Figure 2. The nominal
system is given as
G(s) =
s2 + 3s+ 2
s2 + s+ 2
(20)
and is controlled by a lead compensator
C(s) = 1.37
s+ 0.91
s+ 1.08
(21)
to satisfy some tracking objective. Under normal operation, the
system is stable with adequate performance.
A time-varying input delay τ(t), modeling a DoS attack or
actuator failure, is introduced to the system starting at time
t = 35. The delay gradually increases to reach the value of
0.5s at t = 40. With no further fault tolerant control in action,
the loop will become unstable (the diverging output is not
depicted here).
The proposed data-driven algorithm detects the fault in the
system and reconfigure the controller in time by online design
of the M matrix. At each time step, a new estimate is done,
and if necessary, the reconfiguration matrix is recomputed. The
algorithm keeps the loop stable, as shown by the output of the
system in Figure 4. The elements of the M -matrix are also
depicted in Figure 5. It can be seen that because of the freedom
in designing M, some elements are chosen as constant and
change based on the measurements. As can be seen in Figure 4,
the system output starts to diverge after t = 35, however the
algorithm takes over around t = 40 and makes the system
stable. The performance may not be ideal, but the role of the
algorithm is to maintain stability quickly and with minimum
knowledge of the system.
To achieve a better performance, after the reconfiguration
has happened, the elements of the M -matrix can be slightly
ajusted by a separate algorithm to improve the performance.
Similar approaches are presented in [37], [38] and will not be
covered here.
It is worth noting that the algorithm did not include the
transfer function of either the system or the controller, nor is
it based on the nature and specifics of the fault.
B. Nonlinear Dynamics
Consider the system in (20) where now the fault is a change
in the dynamics; namely the linear dynamics will suddenly
become nonlinear (next example will illustrate a physical
example of such a change). Also consider the same compensator
in the loop. The system (20) can be written in state space form
as
x˙1 = −x1 − 2x2 + 2u
x˙2 = x1
y = x1 + u.
(22)
At t = 40s, a fault happens in the system and the new dynamics
will be
x˙1 = −x1 − 2x2 + 2u
x˙2 = x1 − 0.5x22
y = x1 + u.
(23)
which has the same linearization. The compensator will fail
to keep the system stable; however, the proposed algorithm,
with the same exact parameters and thresholds as the last case,
maintains the stability of the loop with suitable performace.
Figure 6 depicts the input and output of the closed-loop system
when the algorithm is in operation. Without the fault mitigation
algorithm, the system will be unstable.
0 20 40 60 80
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0
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Fig. 5. The elements of the reconfiguration matrix M to mitigate the effect
of time delay
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Fig. 6. Input and output of the closed-loop system when the system becomes
nonlinear at t = 40s and the algorithm is in operation
0 20 40 60 80 100
time (s) 
-1
-0.5
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0.5
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y(
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Fig. 7. Input and output of the closed loop system involving a mass,
damper, and spring system when the spring starts to soften at t = 40s.
The reconfiguration algorithm is in action and maintains stability of the loop.
C. Softening Spring
For an example of a physical system, consider a base-excited
mass damper spring system. If there is an ideal linear spring
in the system, the equation of motion can be written as
m(y¨ − u¨) + c(y˙ − u˙) + k(y − u) = 0 (24)
where u(t) is the excitation displacement applied at the bottom
and y(t) is the movement of the mass at the top (these equations
have applications in active suspension systems). Overtime, the
spring can gradually turn into a softening spring, modeled as
m(y¨ − u¨) + c(y˙ − u˙) + k(y − u) + α(y − u)3 = 0 (25)
with α < 0.
In this example, the linear system (with α = 0) is working
with a lag compensator in the loop given as
C = 4.8
s+ 3.006
s+ 2.485
with parameters m = 2, c = 3, and k = 10. At t = 40, the
spring starts to soften, with α gradually reaching −1 at t = 50.
The controller is not able to keep the system stable.
The Algorithm 1 is applied to the loop with ρ0 = ν0 =
−0.15 and detects the change and maintains the stability of
the system. The parameters ν0 and ρ0 are chosen as lower
bounds for passivity indices of the nominal system. The input
and output of the closed-loop system is depicted in Figure 7.
Even though the system does not have perfect tracking after the
fault, the system remains stable and operational. It is a trade-off
between performance and maintaining safety and stability of
the system under unknown malfunctions and faults.
Remark 2. There is a degree of freedom in the elements of
the M -matrix, and it can be exploited to improve performance.
See for example [38] for a bisimulation based performance
optimization. The direct relation of elements of M -matrix and
different performance criteria is still an open question.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented some initial results of a new
fault detection and adaptive controller reconfiguration algorithm.
This method is based on the concept of passivity indices and
relies only on the available data from input and output of
the system. The presented method can detect changes in the
system’s behavior due to many factors including actuator faults
and malicious attacks and can mitigate the fault or attacks by
wrapping a reconfiguration matrix around the existing controller.
The algorithm has shown significant potential as demonstrated
by different examples.
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